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ver the last half century, the
law has assumed an increas-
ingly important place in ani-
mal protection even as it has begun
to point in the direction of true legal
rights for at least some nonhuman
animals. In this chapter I briefly dis-
cuss five aspects of the law: anti-cru-
elty statutes; the necessity of obtain-
ing standing to litigate on behalf of
the interests of nonhuman animals;
evolving protections for great apes;
the movement toward legal rights for
at least some nonhuman animals; and




“Anti-cruelty” is not necessarily syn-
onymous with “animal welfare.”
British law professor Mike Radford
notes that to 
cause an animal to suffer unnec-
essarily, or to subject it to any
other treatment which amounts
to an offence of cruelty, is self-ev-
idently detrimental to its welfare.
To that extent, there is a degree
of affinity between cruelty and
welfare, but the two are far from
being synonymous: prejudicing
an animal’s welfare does not of
itself amount in law to cruelty.1
“Anti-cruelty” is also not synonymous
with “animal rights.” Speaking of the
entire body of legislation in the area
of nonhuman animal welfare in the
nineteenth century, Radford explains
that “while this legislation imposed
restrictions on how animals could be
treated, none of it—nor, indeed, any
enacted subsequently—change [sic]
the traditional legal status accorded
to animals by the courts.”2 That sta-
tus was as property3, and property
generally lacks rights.
There is no federal anti-cruelty
statute in the United States. But,
according to American law professor
David Favre, the anti-cruelty statutes
of the fifty states “are so similar in
nature and the issues so fundamental
that there is very little variation in
judicial outlook around the coun-
try.”4 In 2002 these statutes strongly
resembled not just each other, but
also the anti-cruelty statutes that
existed in 1950, in 1900, and, indeed,
in 1850.5 Radford says that, in both
the United States and the United
Kingdom, “(t)he gist of the offense”
today is as it has been for nearly two
hundred years, “the infliction of
unnecessary abuse or unnecessary or
unjustifiable pain and suffering upon
an animal.”6 In neither country,
explains the leading American legal
encyclopedia, has it been “the pur-
pose of such statutes to place unrea-
sonable restrictions upon the use,
enjoyment, or possession of animals
or to interfere with the necessary dis-
cipline or government of animals.”7
The last half-century has seen two
significant changes in American anti-
cruelty statutes, and they are rapidly
trending in opposite directions. The
penalties for violating state anti-cru-
elty statutes have gotten tougher
and tougher, but the statutes them-
selves apply to fewer and fewer per-
petrators of nonhuman animal pain
and suffering. 
First, there has been a stiffening of
penalties for conviction. In 1950 the
barest handful of state legislatures
had enacted anti-cruelty statutes that
were felonies or that even provided
for a maximum penalty exceeding
one year of imprisonment.8 The prob-
lem of low penalties, Favre says, “is
the ultimate weakness of most
[anti]cruelty statutes, for no matter
how expansive the language, if the
punishment is not sufficient, then no
real deterrent against the acts
exists.”9 The maximum penalty that a
criminal statute allows is an impor-
tant benchmark. It signals to a judge
how opposed legislators think a soci-
ety actually is to a particular wrong,
for it sets the stiffest penalty that a
wrongdoer who commits a crime in
the most unimaginably horrific way—
or who commits it repeatedly—can
suffer. Because a judge usually will
not impose a penalty near the maxi-
mum for a first or “run-of-the-mill”
offense, the typical penalty for cruel-
ty will remain low so long as the max-
imum penalty remains low. This prob-
lem has begun to ease. While most
anti-cruelty statutes continue to be
misdemeanors, or lesser crimes, by
2002 thirty-four American states and
the District of Columbia had enacted
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statute. Felonies generally are under-
stood to be graver crimes that carry
longer sentences of imprisonment.10
The second trend has been more
ominous for nonhuman animals,
because many of the humans who
commit forms of institutionalized cru-
elty have been exempted from the
reach of anti-cruelty statutes. The
most notorious example is that of non-
human animals raised and killed for
food. According to the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture’s National
Agricultural Statistics Service, in 1998
approximately 9,443 million nonhu-
man animals were killed for food in the
United States; these include cows,
pigs, sheep, chickens, turkeys, and
ducks.11 Yet twenty-five American
states exempt common farming prac-
tices entirely from cruelty prosecution.
Five others exempt some of them.12 As
of 2002 eighteen of these thirty states
had amended their anti-cruelty
statutes to add these exemptions with-
in the previous thirteen years, seven in
the previous eight years.13 More states
are likely to follow.
In the famous English “McLibel”
case, two plaintiffs—McDonald’s Cor-
poration and its English subsidiary—
sued for defamation for, among other
things, statements that they engaged
in cruelty toward the nonhuman ani-
mals whom they served for food. The
corporations urged the trial judge to
rule that in England, as in most
American states, customary farming
practices should be deemed accept-
able. He refused, observing that a
farming practice could be both cruel
and legal, and rejected the McDon-
ald’s request, saying that not “to do
so would be to hand the decision as to
what is cruel to the food industry
completely.”14
That is precisely what the majority
of American states do. Professor David
Wolfson has observed that the “effect
of this trend of amendments cannot
be overemphasized. The trend indi-
cates a nationwide perception that it
was necessary to amend anti-cruelty
statutes to avoid their possible appli-
cation to animals raised for food or
food production. Amendments specif-
ically exempting customary hus-
bandry practices indicate that, but for
the exemption, such practices would
be determined to be cruel.”15
The same problem exists for the
millions of nonhuman animals forced
to be subjects of biomedical research.
The only American biomedical re-
searcher convicted under an anti-cru-
elty statute—perhaps the only one
ever charged—was Edward Taub. Even
his conviction for failing to provide
necessary veterinary care to a monkey
named Nero was reversed on appeal,
on the ground that the Maryland anti-
cruelty statute under which he was
charged was addressed to “unneces-
sary” or “unjustifiable” pain or suffer-
ing, and pain or suffering inflicted
pursuant to biomedical research was
not that kind.16 Thirty states, along
with the District of Columbia, now
exempt nonhuman animals used in
biomedical research from the reach of
their anti-cruelty statutes.17 Many of
these statutes, however, condition
their exemptions upon compliance
with the minimal dictates of the fed-
eral Animal Welfare Act, enacted in
1966. However the Animal Welfare Act
itself exempts the great majority of
nonhuman animals actually used in
biomedical research.18
Standing
Lacking legal personhood and legal
rights, nonhuman animals are essen-
tially invisible to civil judges. This
means that no one can file lawsuits
directly on their behalf. Their inter-
ests can be protected only indirectly.
This can happen when a legal person,
who has legal rights (usually an adult
human being) files a lawsuit either to
stop an illegal act or to seek compen-
sation for injuries already inflicted.
Not just any legal person can sue to
protect animals. American courts
generally prohibit a litigant from
asserting the legal rights of another
person.19 Judges, federal and state,
usually restrict those able to obtain a
judicial decision to plaintiffs with a
sufficient large stake in the outcome
of a controversy.20 This is the doctrine
of “standing.” It allows persons to sue
to redress an injury that they, and
only they, have suffered as a result of
an illegal act. Their remedy may indi-
rectly protect nonhuman animals
who are being injured at the same
time. And that is all the protection
that nonhuman animals ever get from
the civil law.
I limit my discussion of standing to
how it operates in America’s federal
courts and focus on common ways in
which it has an impact on litigation
that seeks to protect the interests of
nonhuman animals. Bear in mind
that the struggle of judges with what
may appear to be a straightforward
standard has led to a federal law of
standing that has been rightly
accused of “suffering from inconsis-
tency, unreliability, and inordinate
complexity.”21
The source of federal judicial power
is Article III, section 2 of the U.S.
Constitution. Federal judges may only
decide “cases” and “controversies.”
In order to surmount the constitu-
tional obstacle of standing, a plaintiff
in a federal court must allege and
prove that he or she has suffered what
has come to be called routinely an
injury-in-fact. It was not until 1970
that the U.S. Supreme Court adopted
this relatively lenient standard.22
Before then, one could obtain stand-
ing only if one could show that one’s
legal right had been invaded.23 An
injury-in-fact must then be “fairly
traceable to . . . allegedly unlawful
conduct and likely to be redressed by
the requested relief.”24
But injury-in-fact, traceability, and
redressability are just the constitu-
tional requirements. There may be
others. The most common of the so-
called prudential requirements for
standing is that a plaintiff’s claim
“must fall within the zone of interests
protected by the law invoked.”25 This
requirement arises when plaintiffs
seek review of the decision of a feder-
al agency under the federal Adminis-
trative Procedures Act.26 It guides a
court in deciding whether the partic-
ular plaintiff who has challenged an
agency’s decision should be heard.27
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If the court decides that the plain-
tiff’s interests are “so marginally
related to or inconsistent with the
purposes implicit in the statute or
that it cannot be reasonably assumed
that Congress intended to permit the
suit,” it will not hear the claim of the
particular plaintiff.28
In the 1990s the Animal Legal
Defense Fund (ALDF) brought a land-
mark trio of cases in the federal
courts in Washington, D.C., to try to
obtain standing to litigate in the
interests of nonhuman animals.
Three times ALDF won in the District
Court and three times these victories
were overturned by a three-judge
panel of the Court of Appeals.  On the
appeal of the third decision to the full
bench of that court, ALDF achieved a
singular success.
In the first case, Animal Legal
Defense Fund v. Espy (I),29 an inactive
researcher and a lawyer-member of an
animal oversight committee, as well
as two animal protection organiza-
tions, complained that the Secretary
of Agriculture had excluded 90 per-
cent of the nonhuman animals who
were used in biomedical research—
rats, mice, and birds—from the defin-
ition of “animal” in the regulations
he was required to issue under the
federal Animal Welfare Act.30 A three-
judge panel of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia found the
researcher had not suffered the
required injury-in-fact because it was
not immediate, while the lawyer was
said to be improperly trying to com-
pel a general executive enforcement
of the law. The organizations were dis-
missed from the suit, for although
they met the three constitutional
requirements for standing, they did
not fall within the zone of interest of
the Animal Welfare Act. 
In a second case, Animal Legal
Defense Fund v. Espy (II),31 the same
Court of Appeals turned aside for lack
of standing a challenge to the suffi-
ciency of the standards that the Sec-
retary of Agriculture had issued for
the exercise of dogs used in biomed-
ical research and to promote a physi-
cal environment adequate to meet
the psychological well-being of pri-
mates. This time an ape language
researcher was said to lack standing
because it was his university, and not
he, who might have suffered an injury,
while a business that sold primate
housing that could be used if valid
standards had been issued lacked
standing because it fell outside of the
zone of interests.
In 1996 the ALDF tried a third
time, claiming once again that the
Secretary of Agriculture had failed to
issue the minimum standards re-
quired to promote the psychological
well-being of primates. One plaintiff,
Marc Jurnove, was alleged to have vis-
ited a zoo repeatedly and seen pri-
mates kept in inhumane conditions
whom he intended to continue to visit
regularly. For the third time, a panel
of the Court of Appeals reversed a
lower court victory for the Animal
Legal Defense Fund. This time a fur-
ther appeal was requested before all
the judges of that Appeals Court, and
they ruled, 7 to 4, that Jurnove had
standing.32 The majority said that
people have a protected aesthetic
interest in observing animals free
from inhumane treatment. It turned
back arguments that the dissent
embraced that a plaintiff could obtain
standing only if he alleged that ani-
mals whom he wished to observe
faced extinction, not just suffering;
that causation did not exist because
the Department of Agriculture had
not authorized the inhumane treat-
ment, but had just not acted to pre-
vent it; and that one could only spec-
ulate that any changes in the
treatment of the primates would
actually satisfy Jurnove’s aesthetic
sensibilities. In 2000 other plaintiffs
used this victory to obtain standing
in, and finally to win, another lawsuit
that complained that the Secretary of
Agriculture had illegally excluded
rats, mice, and birds from the defini-
tion of “animals” to be protected by
the Animal Welfare Act.33 Unfortu-
nately, in 2002 Congress enacted an
exemption to the definition of ani-
mals that nullified this win. The




In Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal
Rights for Animals (2000), I argued
that, under the common law, entitle-
ment to legal rights turns on the
nature of an animal’s mind; that
numerous scientific investigations
have demonstrated that at least two
great apes, chimpanzees and bono-
bos, possess minds so extraordinary
that they tower above the minimum
sufficient for rights; and that the day
has come to grant basic legal rights
to these apes. In Drawing the Line:
Science and the Case for Animal
Rights (2002), I made the same argu-
ment on behalf of the other two great
apes, gorillas and orangutans.
That day in which the great apes
obtain legal rights will cap a long
legal and political process. Among its
first fruits were the 1985 amend-
ments to the Animal Welfare Act.
There the Secretary of Agriculture
was directed to “promulgate stan-
dards to govern the humane han-
dling, care, treatment, and trans-
portation of animals by dealers,
research facilities, and exhibitors. . .
[and to] include minimum require-
ments. . . [for] a physical environment
adequate to promote the psychologi-
cal well-being of primates.”34 This
amounted to a recognition by Con-
gress that primates had a psychology
that could be in good health or poor.
Britain was next to step in the
direction of legal rights for great
apes. In 1997, on its own initiative,
the British government’s Home Sec-
retary banned the use of all four
species of great apes, not just chim-
panzees and bonobos but orangutans
and gorillas, too, as biomedical re-
search subjects.35 This ban on the use
of great apes, he wrote, “was a matter
of morality. The cognitive and behav-
ioural characteristics and qualities of
these animals mean that it is unethi-
cal to treat them as expendable for
research.”36 Under current British
legislation, there must be a weighing
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of the cost to a nonhuman animal of
a biomedical procedure with the ben-
efit to human beings. Only when the
human benefit outweighs the nonhu-
man cost may the procedure be
licensed. Steve Wilkes, head of the
Home Office’s Animal Procedures
Section, said that the benefit to a
human being could never outweigh
the cost to a great ape.37
In New Zealand a 1998 attempt led
to formal Parliamentary hearings that
were highly publicized around the
world. Prominent New Zealand advo-
cates of legal rights for great apes,
including lawyers, professors, scien-
tists, and philosophers, sought to
build upon an idea that had been the
focus of a powerful book, The Great
Ape Project: Equality Beyond Human-
ity.38 Animal Welfare Bill No. 2, which
sought to streamline and modernize
Kiwi animal protection law, was pend-
ing before the New Zealand Parlia-
ment. The submitters sought to have
it amended as proposed by the group
Great Ape Project (New Zealand) in
order to grant great apes three basic
legal rights. These were the rights not
to be deprived of life, not to be sub-
jected to torture or cruel treatment,
and not to be subjected to medical or
scientific experimentation. They also
sought to provide for the appoint-
ment, when necessary, of human
guardians to defend these great ape
rights.39
In their Submission to Parliament,
the submitters argued that
[b]eing fellow hominids, the
great apes are more closely relat-
ed to humans than to any other
animals. They share many of our
characteristics including some
that we thought were uniquely
ours, such as self-awareness, the
ability to reason and the ability to
imagine what others are thinking
and feeling. In humans, these
traits are often cited as a basis for
ascribing basic legal rights. We
believe that a strong case now
exists for giving basic legal rights
to the other members of the
Hominidae family. 
The Animal Welfare Act of 1999
that eventually cleared the New
Zealand Parliament did not grant
legal rights to the great apes. Instead
it prohibited research, testing, and
teaching involving the use of a great
ape without approval of the director-
general who, in granting approval,
must be satisfied that use of the ape
is in his or her best interests or in the
best interests of his or her species,
and that the benefits to be derived are
not outweighed by the likely harm to
the ape.40
In the United States, at least chim-
panzees, but likely all the great apes,
appear to be edging toward a de facto
“right” to life. If not the most expen-
sive nonhuman animals to maintain
in biomedical research, chimpanzees
certainly are among the most expen-
sive. In 1995 it was estimated that it
cost between $113,000 and $321,000
to maintain a captive chimpanzee
used in biomedical research over his
or her natural lifespan.41 That it
would doubtless be far cheaper to kill
them the way mice and rats routinely
are killed when their usefulness has
ceased was forcefully etched in a
minority statement appended to a
report of the National Research Coun-
cil, an arm of the National Academy
of Sciences, in 1997. The statement
firmly opposed the use of public
money to support chimpanzees in
retirement sanctuaries, “since there
is no potential return on research dol-
lars invested in chimpanzees perma-
nently removed from the research
pool,” and urged that they be eutha-
nized.42 The majority, however, reject-
ed euthanasia as a method of popula-
tion control of captive chimpanzees
on the grounds that
the phylogenetic status and psy-
chological complexity of chim-
panzees indicate that they should
be accorded a special status with
regard to euthanasia that might
not apply to other research ani-
mals, for example, rats, dogs, or
some other nonhuman primates.
Simply put, killing a chimpanzee
currently requires more ethical
and scientific justification than
killing a dog, and it should con-
tinue to do so.43
In 2002 a move was afoot to have
all the countries of the world, but
especially the so-called range coun-
tries, embrace an international Decla-
ration for the Protection of Great
Apes and a subsequent Convention
for the Protection of Great Apes that
name the great apes as “World Her-
itage Species.” This is a new category
roughly modeled on the existing
treaty that allows for the designation
of World Heritage Sites. If this decla-
ration materializes, the new category
of World Heritage Species would
tighten the protection of great apes
under international law and under
the domestic law of range countries





The ancient Greek and Roman worlds
were dominated by the belief that the
universe was designed for human
beings. Small wonder that from these
worlds emerged the jurisprudential
idea that, in the words of the early
Roman jurist Hermogenianus, “All law
was established for men’s sake.”45
Why should law not have been estab-
lished just for the sake of men?
According to the early Greeks and
Romans, everything else was. In
Roman law, “persons” had legal
rights, while “things” were the
objects of the rights of persons. And
all those beings who were believed to
lack free will—women, children,
slaves, the insane, and nonhuman ani-
mals—were at some time classified as
property. 
Roman law has had a tremendous
effect upon Western law as a whole,
and especially upon property law. The
law of nonhuman animals in the Unit-
ed States at the beginning of the sec-
ond millennium is nearly identical to
the Roman law of nonhuman animals
as it existed when the first millenni-
um turned. While all humans are
legal persons, all legal persons are not
human beings. Some are artificial
persons, like corporations and ships.
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However, all of the more than one mil-
lion species of nonhuman animals—
chimpanzees, cheetahs, cats, and
cockroaches—are not legal persons
but are legal things. 
Some may confuse being the object
of legal protection with having legal
personhood. They may point to the
criminal anti-cruelty statutes, which I
briefly discussed, that have existed for
well over a century in every American
jurisdiction as evidence that nonhu-
man animals are legal persons with
legal rights. But they would probably
be wrong. Criminal statutes are pro-
hibitions enacted by legislatures.
Sometimes they protect persons, as
when legislatures make it a crime to
assault a fellow human being. But
they may also commonly protect
things. For example, in Massachusetts
it is a felony, punishable by imprison-
ment for up to five years, to destroy a
cemetery shrub. It also is a crime to
smash the windshield of your neigh-
bor’s automobile or set his dog afire.
Violate these prohibitions and you
may be charged with a crime by the
state, convicted, and punished. But
neither the shrub nor the automobile
nor the dog has thereby been given
any legal rights.
What are legal rights? Potter Stew-
art, a twentieth century justice of the
United States Supreme Court,
famously observed about pornogra-
phy, “I know it when I see it.”46 Simi-
larly, people have an intuitive “feel”
for what legal rights are, even if they
can’t quite define them. Some of the
most important rights, such as bodily
integrity and bodily liberty, act like a
suit of legal armor, shielding the bod-
ies and personalities of natural per-
sons from invasion and injury. These
rights are so important that they usu-
ally are enshrined in the bills of rights
of state and federal constitutions. 
For most of the last century, legal
scholars, judges, and lawyers often
classified legal rights in the way that
Wesley Hohfeld, a professor at Yale
Law School, proposed during World
War I. Hohfeld said that a legal right
was any theoretical advantage con-
ferred by recognized legal rules. He
broke legal rights into their lowest
common denominators, using terms
that judges commonly employ, such
as privilege, claim, duty, immunity,
disability, power, and liability, but he
never formally defined them. Instead,
he spelled out how the common
denominators relate to each other.
According to Hohfeld, legal relation-
ships can exist only between two legal
persons and one thing. One of the two
persons always has a legal advantage
(or right) over the other. The other
person has the corresponding legal
disadvantage. Just as a man can’t be
a husband without a wife and a
woman can’t be a wife without a hus-
band, neither a legal advantage nor a
disadvantage can exist all by itself.
The legal rights of nonhuman ani-
mals might first be achieved in any of
three ways. Most agree that the least
likely will be through the re-interpre-
tation or amendment of state or fed-
eral constitutions, or through inter-
national treaties. For example, the
Treaty of Amsterdam that came into
force on May 1, 1999, formally
acknowledged that nonhuman ani-
mals are “sentient beings” and not
merely goods or agricultural prod-
ucts. The European Community and
the member states signatory to the
treaty are required “to pay full regard
to the welfare requirements of ani-
mals.” In 2002 the German Parlia-
ment amended Article 26 of the Basic
Law to give nonhuman animals the
right to be “respected as fellow crea-
tures” and to be protected from
“avoidable pain.” Half of the sixteen
German states already have some sort
of animal rights provisions in their
constitutions.47
In the United States, most believe
that gaining personhood is much
more probable through legislative
enactment than through a constitu-
tional change. But a change in the
common law (which Germany does
not have) may be the most likely of
all. What is the common law? Lemuel
Shaw, the nineteenth century chief
justice of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, provided this good
definition: it “consists of a few broad
and comprehensive principles, found-
ed on reason, natural justice, and
enlightened public policy, modified
and adapted to all the circumstances
of all the particular cases that fall
within it.”48
Why the common law over legisla-
tion? The common law is created by
English-speaking judges while in the
process of deciding cases. Unlike leg-
islators, judges are at least formally
bound to do justice. Properly inter-
preted, the common law is meant to
be flexible, adaptable to changes in
public morality, and sensitive to new
scientific discoveries. Among its chief
values are liberty and equality. These
favor common law personhood, as a
matter of liberty, at least for those
nonhuman animals, such as chim-
panzees, bonobos, gorillas, orang-
utans, dolphins, and whales, who pos-
sess such highly advanced cognitive
abilities as consciousness, perhaps
even self-consciousness; a sense of
self; and the abilities to desire and act
intentionally. In other words, they
have what I call a “practical autono-
my,” which is, I argue, sufficient,
though not necessary, for basic legal
rights.49 An animal’s species is irrele-
vant to his or her entitlement to lib-
erty rights; any who possesses practi-
cal autonomy has what is sufficient
for basic rights as a matter of liber-
ty.50 And as long as society awards
personhood to non-autonomous
humans, such as the very young, the
severely retarded, and the persistent-
ly vegetative, then it must also award
basic rights, as a matter of equality as




I have written that an animal rights
lawyer should not expect a judge to
appreciate the merits of arguments in
favor of the legal personhood of any
nonhuman animal the first time, or
the fifth time, he or she encounters
them. While a sympathetic judge
might be found here and there, no
appellate bench will seize the lead
until the issue has been thoroughly
aired in law journals, books, and con-
ferences. Law reviews discussing ani-
mal legal rights must be established
around the country in order to pro-
vide an important scholarly forum in
which the relevant legal issues can be
explored. Legal conferences must be
organized, law school courses devoted
to educating students on animal law
issues must be established, animal
rights lawyers and law professors
must reach out to acquaint the pro-
fession with the importance of their
work and the power of their argu-
ments.51
Legal education, in every sense of
that term—law reviews, legal confer-
ences, and law school courses—is
critical to the legal changes that ani-
mal rights lawyers seek. As of 2002
much work remained. In 1950 it had
not even begun. The wildlife legal
scholar Michael Bean has written
that, even in 1977, “the very term
‘wildlife law’ was novel, for few had
seen fit to distinguish such a body of
law from the broader categories of
‘environmental law’ or ‘natural
resources law.’”52
In 1950 no law reviews—those
scholarly journals published by the
students of every American law
school—were devoted exclusively to
even environmental (much less ani-
mal rights) law. That gap was not
plugged until 1970, when Environ-
mental Law began to be published by
students of the Northwestern School
of Law of Lewis and Clark College in
Portland, Oregon. In the middle of
the twentieth century no law school
classes solely addressed environmen-
tal law, much less wildlife law. The
more arcane subjects of animal pro-
tection law and animal rights law lay
nearly forty years in the future.  
There were no animal law confer-
ences in 1950. In the 1980s the Ani-
mal Legal Defense Fund held sporadic
conferences.  By 2002 four state bar
associations (in Washington, Texas,
Michigan, and Washington, D.C.) had
formed animal law sections, as had
the New York City and San Diego
County bar associations. Several
states (Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
and Oregon) appeared to be in the
process of forming animal law sec-
tions. Since 1995 the Committee on
Legal Issues of the Association of the
Bar of New York City has held a con-
tinuing series of educational semi-
nars on animal issues, and annual full-
blown legal conferences. This series
of programs was capped by “The
Legal Status of Non-Human Ani-
mals,” a 1999 conference that
attracted speakers from three conti-
nents and hundreds of participants.53
The Center for the Expansion of Fun-
damental Rights has begun a pro-
gram to take the issue of animal
rights law directly to the judges who
will be making the decisions, by offer-
ing to send speakers to judicial con-
ferences throughout the United
States.
Precisely a quarter century after
Environmental Law was founded, Ani-
mal Law joined it as a sister publica-
tion. David Favre wrote in the pre-
miere issue that,
[i]n the tradition of the prior stu-
dents at Lewis and Clark, a sub-
stantial number of present stu-
dents have focused upon what will
be a cutting area of scholarship
for the next generation of law stu-
dents—animal related legal
issues. In the 1970s the new area
of jurisprudence was environmen-
tal law. In the 1990s there is a
growing interest in animal
issues.”54
Animal Law is important because
it was, and remains, both a cause and
an effect of the intensifying interest
in animal law within the legal profes-
sion, an interest that must continue
to build if animal rights lawyers are to
succeed. (As of 2002 a second animal
law review, this one a Northeast
regional publication, was in the plan-
ning stages.) It is important that gen-
eral law reviews have begun publish-
ing animal law articles, including
those written by such prominent legal
academics as Cass Sunstein of the
University of Chicago School of Law
and Anthony D’Amato of the North-
western University School of Law.
Oxford University Press has just pub-
lished a series of groundbreaking
essays edited by Sunstein and Martha
Nussbaum in Animal Rights: Current
Debates in New Directions. 
The first American law school class
in animal law was offered by the Pace
University School of Law in White
Plains, New York, in the mid-1980s.
The instructor was adjunct professor
Jolene Marion, a pioneer in animal
rights law. Though it lasted just a few
years, it paved the way for every ani-
mal law class that followed. In 1990 I
began teaching a law school class at
the Vermont Law School, again as an
adjunct. This course, entitled “Animal
Rights Law,” focused on whether non-
human animals should be eligible for
basic legal rights. 
In 2002 animal law classes were
being offered at nineteen American
law schools, including Harvard,
Georgetown, UCLA, Hastings, and
George Washington universities.
Courses were being offered in the
United Kingdom, Holland, and Aus-
tria. Most of these courses were
taught by practitioners acting as
adjunct professors or lecturers on law.
They offered such an intellectual
smorgasbord that a student might
attend several and encounter little
repetition.
Most focused on “animal law” and
surveyed either the statutes and case
law in which the nature of nonhuman
animals is important, or “animal pro-
tection law,” which addresses how
attorneys can protect the interests of
nonhuman animals within a legal sys-
tem that considers them to be legal
things. Some courses, however, con-
centrated on “animal rights law,” in
which the arguments are explored for
and against having judges recognize
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that at least some nonhuman animals
possess at least some basic legal
rights. All classes were given a boost
by the publication in the year 2000 of
Animal Law, the first casebook exclu-
sively concerned with animal law
issues.55 As its authors noted, “There
has been a reticence in many legal
quarters to teach, learn, or practice
in the area specifically because of the
absence of meaningful assistance and
coverage.” The authors’ hope that
their casebook will “serve as a valu-
able guide to students and professors
stepping onto this new frontier and
provide more law schools with a tem-
plate for animal law courses” has
been fulfilled.56
The last fifty years—and especially
the last ten—have seen tremendous
strides in the evolution of animal pro-
tection law, both in its teaching and
in the laying of the foundations for
true animal rights law.  The first seri-
ous attempts to gain legal rights for
at least some nonhuman animals will
likely be upon us in this decade.
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